In the year 2020, most of us are likely to get the Corona virus. While we witness the pandemic disease wreaking havoc around the globe, we must conclude that the new COVID19 virus does not make people ill enough, fast enough, to stop it from spreading rapidly. It has infected many, many people, because of its newness: we have no immunity yet, and no cure by medicine. All doctors can do is fight the symptoms and help people overcome the disease with all intensive care means available.[^1]

Therefore, governments on every continent and in every country do what they can to protect our health care systems from being overwhelmed by deterring its spread ("flattening the curve") as much as possible. A disease that infects great numbers of patients at the same time, results in a peak demand for our health care facilities and the margins of intensive care beds at hospitals can only absorb so much. The disease is unlikely to have serious consequences for healthy people, but if many chronically ill or vulnerable elderly get infected, it will put them in danger and our health care system under a lot of strain.

What citizens really need to fear however, is not so much their personal infection with the virus, but the incompetence of their governments to respond to the threat adequately and transparently, as well as the counterproductive reactions by other citizens and actors. Trade wars regarding medical supplies, paralyzing lockdowns, disinformation campaigns, attacks on fellow citizens, hacks on health care institutes and panic buying are among the irrational and even downright outrageous responses. Combatting the Corona pandemic requires insights on the governance of crises, and on community resilience.

From the perspective of even the most capable and responsive governments, COVID‐19 could be seen as a "creeping crisis". As Arjen Boin, Magnus Ekengren and Mark Rhinard argue in the opening article of this RHCPP issue, creeping crisis have a "potential to undercut the legitimacy of public institutions" (Boin et al., [2020](#rhc312194-bib-0001){ref-type="ref"}, p. 3). After continuous expert warnings for the rise of a new pandemic, COVID‐19\'s escalation into public view seemed to indicate failed prevention and ignorance by public health institutions designed to protect citizens from exactly that type of crisis. Boin et al. offer a set of concepts and insights on Corona and other creeping crises that help us understand their devastating potential.

Disasters hopefully bring out the best in people. Trust between governments and citizens, plus social trust within communities should facilitate or stimulate that. Most victims in a train or airplane crash are saved by the stranger sitting next to them. Most people whose house is flooded are saved by neighbors in small rubber boat. Communities where people know each other and work together, show a surprising resilience and speedy recovery (Kyne and Aldrich, [2020](#rhc312194-bib-0004){ref-type="ref"}).

Issue 11.2 of *Risk, Hazards and Crisis in Public Policy* offers a set of articles about the real heroes behind the scenes of response to disaster and adversity. Danielsson and Sjöstedt‐Landen ([2020](#rhc312194-bib-0003){ref-type="ref"}) show how in a local disaster, leader normativity in crisis management narratives legitimizes "strong," hierarchical and male‐dominated positions and actions and marginalizes other actors and contributions that are just as important to the crisis response. Cuomo et al. ([2020](#rhc312194-bib-0002){ref-type="ref"}) point at the positive effects of religiosity on resilience in local communities, whereas Odiase et al. ([2020](#rhc312194-bib-0005){ref-type="ref"}) map the conditions for resilience of ethnic minorities of immigrants in an urban setting. Finally, Roque et al. ([2020](#rhc312194-bib-0006){ref-type="ref"}) show how decentral authorities assisted local communities in reducing vulnerability and coping with disasters by leveraging their social capital. Trust in government institutions and community resilience cannot save us from being seriously affected by COVID19, but it may help to strengthen the response at all levels.
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社论: 新冠病毒时期的理智与韧性 {#rhc312194-sec-0020}
==============================

Sanneke Kuipers, 主编

2020年, 我们中的大多数人都可能感染新冠病毒。在我们观察疾病大流行在全球造成灾害的同时, 我们必须断定, 新型冠状病毒病(COVID‐19)不会止步于让人患病, 更快地患病, 以期停止病毒的快速传播。病毒因其新奇性已感染许多人: 我们还没有免疫能力, 药物也无法治愈。医生所能做的全部就是医治症状, 用一切可能的重症护理手段帮助人们克服疾病。

因此, 全球各国政府极尽所能地阻碍病毒传播(拉平疫情曲线), 防止我们的医疗体系发生崩溃。一个让许多人同时感染的疾病造成了我们的医疗设施出现需求顶峰, 而医院重症护理床位极限无法容纳更多人。疾病不太可能对健康人群产生严重后果, 但如果许多患有长期基础疾病或脆弱的老年人被感染, 疾病将让其处于危险之中, 并且我们的医疗系统也会承担巨大压力。

然而, 公民真正应该担心的不是他们个人感染病毒, 而是政府没有能力以充分和透明的方式响应威胁, 以及其他公民和行为者所作的事与愿违的反应。关于医疗供给的贸易战、限制活动的行动管制、假信息运动、袭击本国公民、攻击医疗机构、以及恐慌购买等都是不理智甚至是彻底无法容忍的响应。打击新冠疫情大流行一事要求在危机治理和社群韧性治理方面提供见解。

甚至从那些最有能力、响应最为积极的政府的视角来看, COVID‐19可被视为一次"慢性危机"。如同作者Arjen Boin、Magnus Ekengren 和Mark Rhinard在本期RHCPP第一篇文章中所主张的一样, 慢性危机有"潜力削弱公共机构的合法性"(Boin et al, forthcoming, p. 3)。在专家对一种新疾病大流行的出现不断发出预警后, COVID‐19却不断攀升进入公众视野, 这似乎表明公共卫生机构的预防失败和忽视, 而后者本身就应保护公民免受这类危机。Boin等人就新冠疫情和其他慢性危机提供了一组帮助我们理解其破坏性潜能的概念和见解。

但愿灾害能激发人最优秀的一面。政府与公民的相互信任, 加上社群内的社会信任, 应对此有所助益或激励。大多数遭遇火车事故或空难的受害者都被身旁的陌生人拯救。大多数房屋受洪灾侵袭的人都被邻居用小型橡皮艇拯救。在人们相互认识并合作的社群中, 展现了出乎意料的韧性和快速的恢复能力(Kyne and Aldrich, [2020](#rhc312194-bib-0010){ref-type="ref"})。

《公共政策中的风险、灾害与危机》第11卷第2期提供的一系列文章研究了灾害与困难响应场景背后的真英雄。作者Erna Danielsson 与Angelika Sjöstedt‐Landen(2020)表明, 危机管理叙事中的领导规范性在地方灾害中如何对"强势的"、阶级性的、由男性主导的立场和行动合法化, 而忽视那些对危机响应而言同等重要的其他行动者和贡献。作者Rafael Cuomo等人([2020](#rhc312194-bib-0008){ref-type="ref"})指出了地方社群中宗教性对韧性产生的积极作用, 而作者Osamuede Odiase等人([2020](#rhc312194-bib-0011){ref-type="ref"})描绘了城市背景下移民中的少数民族获得韧性的条件。最后, 作者Anaïs Roque等人([2020](#rhc312194-bib-0012){ref-type="ref"})表明, 去中心化的政府如何通过利用其社会资本, 协助地方社群减少脆弱性并应对危机。对政府机构的信任及社群韧性可能无法帮助我们不遭受COVID‐19的严重影响, 但有可能帮助加强各个层面的灾害响应。
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Sanneke Kuipers, Editora principal

In the year 2020, most of us are likely to get the Corona virus. While we witness the pandemic disease wreaking havoc around the globe, we must conclude that the new COVID19 virus does not make people ill enough, fast enough, to stop it from spreading rapidly. It has infected many, many people, because of its newness: we have no immunity yet, and no cure by medicine. All doctors can do is fight the symptoms and help people overcome the disease with all intensive care means available.[^2]

Therefore, governments on every continent and in every country do what they can to protect our health care systems from being overwhelmed by deterring its spread ("flattening the curve") as much as possible. A disease that infects great numbers of patients at the same time, results in a peak demand for our health care facilities and the margins of intensive care beds at hospitals can only absorb so much. The disease is unlikely to have serious consequences for healthy people, but if many chronically ill or vulnerable elderly get infected, it will put them in danger and our health care system under a lot of strain.

What citizens really need to fear however, is not so much their personal infection with the virus, but the incompetence of their governments to respond to the threat adequately and transparently, as well as the counterproductive reactions by other citizens and actors. Trade wars regarding medical supplies, paralyzing lockdowns, disinformation campaigns, attacks on fellow citizens, hacks on health care institutes and panic buying are among the irrational and even downright outrageous responses. Combatting the Corona pandemic requires insights on the governance of crises, and on community resilience.

From the perspective of even the most capable and responsive governments, COVID‐19 could be seen as a "creeping crisis". As Arjen Boin, Magnus Ekengren and Mark Rhinard argue in the opening article of this RHCPP issue, creeping crisis have a "potential to undercut the legitimacy of public institutions" (Boin et al., [2020](#rhc312194-bib-0013){ref-type="ref"}, p. 3). After continuous expert warnings for the rise of a new pandemic, COVID‐19\'s escalation into public view seemed to indicate failed prevention and ignorance by public health institutions designed to protect citizens from exactly that type of crisis. Boin et al. offer a set of concepts and insights on Corona and other creeping crises that help us understand their devastating potential.

Disasters hopefully bring out the best in people. Trust between governments and citizens, plus social trust within communities should facilitate or stimulate that. Most victims in a train or airplane crash are saved by the stranger sitting next to them. Most people whose house is flooded are saved by neighbors in small rubber boat. Communities where people know each other and work together, show a surprising resilience and speedy recovery (Kyne and Aldrich, [2020](#rhc312194-bib-0016){ref-type="ref"}).

Issue 11.2 of *Risk, Hazards and Crisis in Public Policy* offers a set of articles about the real heroes behind the scenes of response to disaster and adversity. Danielsson and Sjöstedt‐Landen ([2020](#rhc312194-bib-0015){ref-type="ref"}) show how in a local disaster, leader normativity in crisis management narratives legitimizes "strong," hierarchical and male‐dominated positions and actions and marginalizes other actors and contributions that are just as important to the crisis response. Cuomo et al. ([2020](#rhc312194-bib-0014){ref-type="ref"}) point at the positive effects of religiosity on resilience in local communities, whereas Odiase et al. ([2020](#rhc312194-bib-0017){ref-type="ref"}) map the conditions for resilience of ethnic minorities of immigrants in an urban setting. Finally, Roque et al. ([2020](#rhc312194-bib-0018){ref-type="ref"}) show how decentral authorities assisted local communities in reducing vulnerability and coping with disasters by leveraging their social capital. Trust in government institutions and community resilience cannot save us from being seriously affected by COVID19, but it may help to strengthen the response at all levels.
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[^1]: [https://www.who.int/news‐room/q‐a‐detail/q‐a‐coronaviruses\#:\~:text=protect](https://www.who.int/news-room/q-a-detail/q-a-coronaviruses#:~:text=protect), retrieved on April 4, 2020.

[^2]: [https://www.who.int/news‐room/q‐a‐detail/q‐a‐coronaviruses\#:\~:text=protect](https://www.who.int/news-room/q-a-detail/q-a-coronaviruses#:~:text=protect), retrieved on April 4, 2020.
